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I.  HOW LITTLE WE KNOW
Good morning.  Across the legal field, people are re-imagining the nature
of law outside and among states.   And we lawyers are not alone.  Our
colleagues throughout the social sciences, in economics, political science,
sociology, anthropology and more are all thinking anew about global patterns
of power and influence.
The simple fact that people are thinking anew is itself of real
significance.  Significant because it reflects how little we actually know about
how we are governed. 
Global governance remains a mystery because so much about global
society itself eludes our grasp.  Everywhere we can see the impact of things
global, foreign, far away.   How does it all work, how do all the pieces fit
together?   How is public power exercised, where are the levers, who are the
authorities, how do they relate to one another?   
Are the worlds of politics, markets and cultural influence held together
in a tight structure or is it all more loose and haphazard?   Are there more than
one global order—how much, in the end, is simply chaos, how much the work
of an invisible hand?   828 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
These questions become urgent when they touch an issue about which we
care deeply.  How is so much poverty sustained in a world of such plenty?
What separates leading from lagging sectors, cultures or nations from one
another?  How can security be achieved between and within the world’s
different cultures and nations.  If we want to do something about poverty or
the environment—if we would like to complain or protest or simply
participate —to whom should we address ourselves?   
Indeed, how has knowledge about all this itself come to be so unequally
distributed?   If we understood the machinery by which inequalities and
hierarchies of influence and wealth and knowledge are reproduced, we might
begin to know how to make the world a better place. 
None of these questions have clear answers.  We do not know how power
is put together on the global stage, let alone how its exercise might be
rendered just or effective.   Indeed, we are only just beginning to unravel the
mystery of global governance.  Simply mapping the modes of global power
and identifying the channels and levers of influence remains an enormous
sociological challenge.  
At the same time, we must remember that not that long ago most in the
legal profession thought they knew how it all worked.  There was private law
and public law, national law and international law, each with its own domain.
Global governance was the sum of these well known parts, each served by its
own disciplinary experts.   It is fascinating how quickly that confidence has
disappeared and those disciplinary boundaries have broken down.   
I would like to think it was partly that decades of critical inquiry were
finally rewarded, broke through.   But I suspect it was a slowly rising tide of
skepticism—accumulated frustration among all those navigating the global
political economy with only our routine maps of how the global game is
played and where the rules are made. 
We may take some comfort that our colleagues in political science and
sociology and anthropology and economics were equally confident, if at
different moments, and have also had their comeuppance.  There were
ritualized disputes—realism and constructivism, neo-marginalism and
institutionalism, and so on.  Yet each of these disciplines thought that, by and
large, they had a pretty good sense for how the global picture fit together.  
As an avid consumer of their work, I must say I would not want to navigate by
their maps of world power.   Everywhere there is important knowledge,
promising new initiatives, intriguing insights.   But somehow the broader
picture remains elusive.  
In part we can blame specialization.  Not that long ago, many leading
public international lawyers were simply ignorant of international economic
law and trade—outside their concern.  Internationalists on every faculty had
something of the ghetto mentality.  Each subfield defended its turf.   The study
of European law was a rather dramatic example precisely because it arose so2008] THE MYSTERY OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 829
recently, with tributaries in public international law, national business
regulation, constitutional or administrative law and more.   But it soon enough
became a world of its own.   
Disciplinary specialization is not peculiar to lawyers, of course.  The
American academy of internationalists has all become rather parochial.   In
political science, the sub-discipline of “international relations” remains an
overwhelmingly Ango-American peculiarity.    This is partly personnel.  A
tremendously productive generation of Europeans entered the American legal
academy during and after the Second World War—it is difficult to identify
their successors or to find voices from other regions of parallel importance in
our academy today.    But it is also a matter of research agenda.   Even the
most detailed empirical study of comparative patterns across hundreds of
states can hardly help but miss the forest for the trees.  Or see the forest in the
trees it can measure.   The great integrative thinkers of a generation ago seem
amateurish, idiosyncratic.  But has professionalization deepened our insight?
Broadened the scope of our vision?   
In economics, the special situations of smaller markets, developing
economies, informal economies and black markets and clandestine flows all
take second place to the study of interactions among the large post-industrial
economic powers.   It is no secret that as the economics professoriate
professionalized and expanded after the Second World War, they drew the
wagons of endogeneity in an ever-tighter circle until much of what anyone
would want to know about the patterns of international economic life would
need to be learned in exogenous domains relegated to sociology, history,
politics and ethics.   The pendulum has swung ever so slowly back, but the
institutions and political forms and path dependencies brought back within the
economics profession remain thin generalizations for the richness of everyday
life as it is lived in any economy.   
In one after another field, the professionalization of academic knowledge
has rendered us blind to what people in other places know.   This kind of blind
spot is particularly difficult to remedy by interdisciplinary conversation alone,
for so many of our disciplines have been purging themselves of knowledge
from elsewhere in precisely the same way.   Perhaps this is simply one of the
costs of a half-century of intellectual, political and economic hegemony. 
Americans were far more avid importers of scientific ideas a hundred, two
hundred years ago when we were living on the periphery of the world system.
At the same time, ideas about economics and law and political affairs
developed in the United States have had an enormous impact on the world in
the last half century.   Unfortunately, we have often been far better at
exporting our main ideas than the qualifications and critical traditions with
which they arose.   And we have imported so little in return.   Where in our
academic worlds are the great political economists of India or Africa or Latin
America—what do we know of them?   There are experts in American politics830 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
and history in China, in Indonesia, in Brazil—how do they teach our history,
our ideas?   
I have always been struck by the palpable relief among public
international lawyers in the North Atlantic that our field weathered the
collapse of nineteenth century liberalism, the rise of nationalism, the
emergence of international communism, the Soviet Empire, decolonization
and the rise of the third world, of Asia, of cultural difference, of feminism and
and . . . without having to change anything.   It is astonishing.  The Soviets
turned out to be positivists.  The Third World loved their sovereignty.  All
they wanted was a seat on the world court, representation in the international
administrative bureaucracies, a little doctrinal change here or there.  Everyone
could recast their aspirations for justice in the language of universal human
rights.   Beneath the Islamic, the Hindu, the Christian, the Socialist, the
Capitalist traditions lay the same ideas, conveniently spelled out by Eleanor
Roosevelt.   
II.  WHAT WERE WE THINKING?
I can report that the situation in Europe was hardly better.  From Ireland
to Austria, the idea and the institutional machinery of the Europe Union rolled
in like a dense fog, foreshortening the horizon of political imagination for an
entire generation.  If membership is all Europe has to say to its neighbors,
what vision does it offer the rest of the world?   
For generations young lawyers and policy professionals from across the
world have travelled to Europe to learn how their world was made.   What did
they learn?   To pour their humanist aspirations into the most conventional
disciplinary categories, rigorously, even passionately.   It would be touching,
were it not so tragic, to encounter so many well-meant proposals for little
imitation European Unions all over the developing world, as if the
institutional form appropriate for consolidating the local political and
economic power of Europe’s post-industrial welfare states would, luckily
enough, also be an excellent strategy of economic development for today’s
Arab or African or Southern Cone regions.  
 Visiting law faculties in Europe and the United States today, it is striking
the extent to which all this has been swept away.  I was recently at a workshop
in London where more than fifty doctoral students from almost as many
countries described their research, their passion, their intellectual agenda. 
None seemed content with the inherited maps.   Innovation, criticism, the
aspiration to begin again was everywhere.  Where they had come to the center
from far away, they had come to learn how it all fell apart—to engage the
history of criticism present in the West and the North.    
At the same time, in the legal academies of Europe and the United States,
specialists in every field—family law, antitrust, intellectual property, civil2008] THE MYSTERY OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 831
procedure, criminal law, banking and commercial law—have come to see their
subject in international or comparative terms.   It is hard to think of a legal
problem which does not cross disciplinary and national boundaries and it is
common for internationalists themselves to stretch across public and private
law, to teach about trade and security and development, dipping into national
and comparative law as they do.   Off the top of my head I can think of
numerous inventions that would have been unthinkable just a few years back;
I am sure each of you can as well.  I know of at least two courses in “inter-
national local government law,” private law scholars coming out with a legal
casebook on comparative Islamic modernization, a new program devoted to
the law of empire and colonialism, and on and on.  
Part of the explanation is the explosion of voices speaking and writing
about international affairs that can now be heard in the intellectual centers of
the North and West.  The wave of post-colonial thinking, subaltern studies, the
re-launching of area studies, the amazing popularity of study abroad, are all
part of this trend.   
What must it feel like for young intellectuals in Central and Eastern
Europe today, entering a world of ideas frozen in political and economic
calculations made by those who faced one another across the Rhine more than
fifty years ago?  Or watching as their elites chew and swallow the thousands
of regulations made in the shadow of that vision?    Must they content
themselves with a kind of permanent intellectual and political marginality,
orient themselves to a world whose center is Brussels and for which they can
offer only an enduring ethical and political frontier?   And what of those new
Europeans who are German—and Turkish?   Who are French—and African?
British—and[?]  Or those outside Europe, who find themselves in Turkey or
Palestine or Israel and imagine themselves as European?  What place for them
in the European home?
Something similar is happening in the North American legal academy—
an invasion of brilliant young legal intellectuals from all over the place.   At
almost every law school you will find faculty from Kenya or Germany or
Mexico.   They get tenure the same way, teach the same courses, write in a
similar vernacular to their more locally rooted American colleagues and yet
their awareness of the blurriness of disciplinary boundaries as they stretch
across the planet cannot help but break through, along with all their diverse
and complicated emotions about the place of the first world in the third, and
the third world in the first.   There is something exciting in the idea of the
American academy as host for this emerging intellectual diaspora, struggling
to comprehend how the world works and how it might be transformed.    
Let me begin, then, with preliminary thoughts about moments such as
this—moments of both great unknowing and of disciplinary reinvention. 
First, it would be surprising if the new order were waiting to be found
rather than made.  It could be, of course, that our world is already constituted,832 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
structured, governed, and we simply lack the vision to understand how it
works.   It seems more plausible, however, to suppose that our conventional
understanding has broken down because things in the world are changing—
Changing rapidly and in all sorts of different directions at once.  If there is to
be a new order, legal or otherwise, it will be created as much as discovered.
We will need to think of our work on global governance not only as
description, but also as program for a world in transition.  At the same time,
of course, any such program will be but one among many, and will find itself
pushed and pulled by the projects and priorities of all the other actors on the
field.   We will need to think about global governance as a dynamic process,
in which legal, political and economic arrangements unleash interests, change
the balance of forces, and lead to further reinvention of the governance
scheme itself.  
I suspect, moreover, that the changes underfoot are likely to swamp our
efforts to rethink the world by speaking to one another in rooms like this. 
Like constitutional orders before it, a new global governance regime will be
imagined and built through collective hope, struggle and disappointment.  It
will be an order made and known through processes we can only dimly see.
My only consolation is the intuition—and perhaps the hope—that as the world
is re-ordered, law will be there, imagining it, making it, writing it down,
consolidating and contesting the new arrangements.  
Of course, in the meantime, there is an enormous scholarly premium on
being able to see how things will turn out and how they should turn out.   It is
much less satisfying to seek to understand what is unknown, to identify the
powers that elude our grasp, the maps by which it is no longer wise to
navigate, the problems for which there is no ready solution, or the solutions
long since out of alignment with today’s problems.  But I am afraid that is
where we are.   All the rest remains, for the time, a wish.
My second preliminary observation is that knowledge about how we are
governed is very unevenly spread about the planet.   This is also part, if you
like, of how we now find ourselves constituted.   We should not be surprised
to learn that people in the global North and the global South understand the
nature of global power and order quite differently.   It is common to imagine
that our situations are parallel.  One often hears that people in the South know
as much as we do about how things work, they simply have different
objectives and interests.  Or that their knowledge, while different, is equal—
they know local things, perhaps cultural things.  If we have the luxury to
generate theory, they have had the rough luck to inhabit the context where that
theory will meet the road.  In some sense, this is all certainly true.   The
insiders and the powerful certainly have their own characteristic blind spots
and biases.
But we know the gains from the trade of theory for context are rarely
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quite often, see how the order is ordered, where the levers of power do and do
not reside, in ways inaccessible at the periphery.   Yes, they can resist,
reinvent and appropriate—but so, then, can we, for we are also a context to be
reckoned with.   I worry about the disequilibria introduced into the governance
machinery by the unequal distribution of knowledge.  All the more so when
educational resources are themselves so unevenly distributed.   We all know
from our own experience that when you are on the outside looking in, it can
seem the powerful know and intend all that they do.  When you are on the
inside looking out, it is easy to feel buffeted by one thing after another.   We
will need to find ways to assist the intelligentsia at the margins of the world
system in understanding how things look from the center, just as there will be
much we will need to learn from them.   It is easy to think of this as just
educational policy, a matter for the internet and cultural exchange, but it is
more.  The distribution of knowledge about the global order is also a
constitutional issue. 
Looking at legal scholarship today, I wonder what has happened to the
idea of a “global south?”  The idea that there may be a dynamic and structured
relationship between leading and lagging industries, economies, ethnic
alignments, political powers and intellectual fashions makes it sensible to look
for parallels in the experience of all those in the periphery of one or another
world system and to see the operations of the center as only part of the story.
Indeed, only part of the story of the center’s own operation.   In my view, this
remains an extremely promising idea, particularly as the distance between
centers and peripheries shrinks just as the differences between them grows. 
We spend far too little energy understanding what happens in between
—the conveyor belts by which centers and peripheries are brought into
proximity, come to know one another—and to the walls and wills which
nevertheless reinforce their differences.   We might look for such things in lots
of places: in Manchester and Gdansk and Detroit and Mumbai as much as
London and Berlin, New York and Hong Kong.   But also, I expect, in the
hundreds, even thousands of middle cities, exurban sprawls and interlocking
networks of informal spaces, free trade zones and all the places where
migrants send off remittance.  All these places struggle with their insertion
into a lurching and volatile international economy, split between numerous
centers and peripheries without the umbrella of a national or international
public policy able to notice or guarantee their future.  
No, knowledge about the ways the world is governed is not spread
evenly.  It clumps in the centers and spreads unevenly to the periphery.  But
it is also hoarded in all these middle lands and liminal spaces.  
We might say much the same thing about those who live in the worlds of
public and private power on the global level.   In my own experience, I have
certainly found that the corporate lawyers, investment bankers and business-
men of the global economy understand how to operate within a plural and834 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
disaggregated global legal order far more instinctively than do their counter-
parts in national government service, diplomacy or the world of international
public institutions.   In a similar fashion, for all the intense professionalism of
our military today, I have found military professionals, including military
lawyers, having a far more difficult time thinking strategically about
operations in a global battle space stretching across jurisdictions and
characterized by wildly divergent interpretations of supposedly common rules
and principles than their counterparts in the world of transnational finance or
business, for whom legal pluralism is an everyday matter of risk and
opportunity.   
But here again, we must remember the knowledge that clumps in the
middle spaces—the rules of engagement written in the boardrooms of private
contractors, rules which will define our national complicity when shots kill.
 Or the black markets where public and private mingle, the ethnic and
religious and humanitarian networks which instrumentalize a public authority
here, a private power there which stand outside looking in and infiltrate the
operations of formal power.     
The unequal distribution of knowledge about the mysteries of global
governance calls for more than filling in the gaps in what we know and
sharing out what we have learned.   The distribution of knowledge about
strategic action in a fluid world is also a political, economic and social issue
of the first order.   That corporate and financial actors move so easily while
every public authority is constituted around a territorial jurisdiction as a
matter of law has effects.  So does the tendency for the middle zones to slip
outside the visible forms of public and private power altogether.   We ought
to see these distributions as constitutional, structuring the forms of our global
political life.   To comprehend how the world is governed, we must understand
the dynamic effects of people living and struggling not only with different
interests and cultures and values, but also with different knowledge about how
it all works.
Consider this broad brush story.   It cannot be told in the vernacular of
a discipline.  The dynamics of its unfolding are hard to trace in the centers
alone.  At each stage, the middle spaces were crucial midwifes to new
institutional and political forms.  
Over the last century, global labor was liberated from serfdom and
slavery into citizenship, but incarcerated into one or another nation state.   At
first, capital was also largely a prisoner of territory.  In some places there was
an enormous capital shortage and development was difficult, in others a
capital abundance and wages rose.  As capital became able to move, the price
of labor rose wherever development occurred, while capital became relatively
scarce where wages remained high.   The financial, intellectual and business
leaders deracinated themselves, floating freely about the globe.   Those at the
bottom detached from the formal market and the forms of political life to live2008] THE MYSTERY OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 835
in an informal world of illegal migration, remittance and black market
entrepreneurialism.   Meanwhile, politics remained largely the prerogative of
national states, lashed to the interests of a territorial middle class.  The relative
mobility of capital and rigidity of politics rendered each unstable.   In the end
political and economic leadership has everywhere drifted apart, structurally-
linked to different interests, living under different conditions, responding to
different constituencies.   All this was no accident.  Each of these moves was
imagined, implemented and resisted in legal terms.
You can get a good sense for this by traveling the world from one “free
trade zone” to another, enclaves of informality and exceptions from
bureaucratic rule, and then trying to adopt a child abroad or listen for the idea
that Americans and Mexicans might share a common political future in the
speeches of any American local or national election campaign.   All these
territorial arrangements and attitudes are underwritten by law and are part of
how we are globally governed.
I am not sure how significant this story is or even whether it is altogether
correct.  I offer it more as a warning.   The world’s political, economic and
social life is legally organized in ways we rarely find the opportunity to notice
in routine discussions about global law and governance.    We have built fault
lines into the political economy of the world and placed forces in motion
which will remake the habitual channels of global governance just as we are
reaching to understand how it all works.  
III.   EARLIER EFFORTS TO RE-IMAGINE THE LEGAL WORLD AND THE WORLD
IN LEGAL TERMS
The world is changing. Our conventional legal picture of the patterns of
power is no longer adequate.  We need new thinking.  Before we get carried
away, however, we need to remember that the traditional legal disciplines—
public international law, private international law, international economic law,
comparative law, United Nations law—are all also projects of reinvention.
Each began both as an effort to draw a more accurate map of the global regime
and as a project to remake that regime, in part by re-imagining and re-
describing it.   Renewal does repeat. 
We might say that our first contemporary legal project of re-thinking has
been the project, underway for more than twenty years, to write new histories
of our conventional fields.  To understand what they thought they were
renewing and replacing, and how what we have thought about global
governance has nevertheless stayed so long so similar.   We now have
histories which track the origins of contemporary international law not to 1648
or the Roman Empire, but to the mid and late nineteenth century, histories
which link our conventional legal disciplines to the imaginative political and
ideological projects of particular people, inspired by one or another version836 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
1. The literature that I have in mind would include: Myres S. McDougal, Law and Power, 46 AM.
J. INT’L L. 102 (1952): Myres S. McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value
Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World Order, 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 24 (1952); Myres S.
McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 RECUEIL DES COURS
of European liberalism and legalism, wed to the colonial endeavor, and
histories that follow the repeated remaking of these traditions across the
twentieth century in bursts of modernist revision.  As projects of re-imagina-
tion, reconstitution and reform, our conventional disciplines have been pulled
this way and that by political and ideological trends which have swept through
the society and the academy, perhaps most conspicuously in the last years by
feminism and various post-colonialisms, but also by neo-formalism,
institutionalism and fads for everything from linguistic to economic analysis.
There remains much we can learn from exploring these conventional
projects, although we have lost confidence in them both as maps of the world
and as programs for liberal reform.   Taken together, their picture of the way
the world is governed is striking for its blind spots and biases.  The pieces
don’t fit together or add up.  But it remains worth understanding why not and
how they could have seemed so coherent for so long.   The intellectuals who
built them also sought to reconnect the global legal order with the social and
psychological forces of their day, to codify that order, to capture it in
principles, structure it with new institutions, and treat those new institutions
as more than the sum of their parts.   We can learn from their ambitions as
well as their techniques.   Broadly speaking, these were all humanist
endeavors, extending what they had learned at home about humanism to the
global stage.  We can learn from the limitations and possibilities of a century
of legal humanism on the world state.  Moreover, little that these conventional
disciplines set in motion has been lost; it is all there, in fragments, built into
this or that corner of our imagination and our institutional fabric.  Their ideas
and formulations continue to have currency. 
   If we are to launch a new effort to comprehend the ways our world is
governed, I hope we will pause to recall these earlier efforts, if for no other
reason than to remind ourselves that whatever we build will rest atop the still-
smoldering ruins of more than a century’s worth of efforts to describe in new
ways how the world is put together from the point of view, and for the
purpose, of governance. 
Indeed, even when we move away from the conventional disciplines, we
find a history of renewal and reform.   In the United States, three projects of
re-imagination stand out, each, oddly, associated with a particular University.
We might see them as the mothers-of-all-reinventions in the field of global
governance.   The first was the Yale project on World Public Order, pioneered
by Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell in the nineteen fifties.
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133 (1953); Myres S. McDougal, Peace and War: Factual Continuum With Multiple Legal Consequences,
49 AM. J. INT’L. 63 (1955); Myres S. McDougal, The Realist Theory in Pyrrhic Victory, 49 AM. J. INT’L.
376 (1955); Myres S. McDougal, Some Basic Theoretical Concepts About International Law: A Policy-
Oriented Framework of Inquiry, 4 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 337 (1960); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL &
ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (Yale Univ. Press 1960); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL AND
WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
SEAS (Yale Univ. Press 1962); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL AND FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION (Yale Univ. Press 1961);
Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public
Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1959); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (Yale Univ. Press, 1980); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD
D. LASSWELL & JAMES C. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE (Yale Univ. Press 1967); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D.
LASSWELL & IVAN A. VLASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE (Yale Univ. Press 1963); Myres S.
McDougal  and W. Michael Reisman, The Changing Structure of International Law: Unchanging Theory
for Inquiry, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 810 (1965); RICHARD A. FALK, LAW, MORALITY AND WAR IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD (Praeger 1963); RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (Princeton Univ. Press 1964): RICHARD A. FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A
VIOLENT WORLD (Princeton Univ. Press 1968); RICHARD A. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY (Princeton Univ. Press 1970), Richard A. Falk, A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies:
Prospects and Proposals, 84 YALE  L.  J. 969 (1975); ROSALYN  HIGGINS, THE  DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (Oxford Univ. Press
1963); Rosalyn Higgins, Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process, 17 INT’L & COMP.
L. Q. 58 (1968) ); Rosalyn Higgins, Policy and Impartiality: The Uneasy Relationship in International
Law, 23 INT’L ORG. 914 (1969); MORTON A. KAPLAN & NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Wiley 1961); W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE
REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS (Yale Univ. Press 1971). See
also TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYRES S. MCDOUGAL (W.
Michael Reisman & Burns H. Weston eds., Free Press 1976); THE  STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE, AND THEORY (R. St. J. Macdonald and
Douglas M. Johnston eds., Kluwer Boston 1983).
2. Particularly notable contributions include: Thomas M. Franck, The Courts, the State Department
the sociology and philosophy of the interwar period, their effort cast aside
conventional disciplinary boundaries to reconsider the nature of “public
order” from the ground up.   At the base was not the politics of sovereignty,
but neither was there a grundnorm.   There were procedures and values, modes
of communication, persuasion and compulsion.  Everything was on a
continuum, anti-formal, requiring judgment and human ethical choice.   Elites
inhabited a policy process in which they would as often make as follow the
law.  Global governance was a work in progress, a terribly serious business,
neither irrational politics nor rational law, but an ongoing project to choose a
world public order of freedom and justice.  
The second was something of a reaction, an alternative found for a
generation in Manhattan, at Columbia and NYU, and associated with in an
astonishing group of figures: Franck, Friedmann, Henkin, Schachter and their
many colleagues.
2   They were as anti-formal and post-realist as Yale, but their838 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
and National Policy: A Criterion for Judicial Abdication, 44 MINN. L. REV. 1101 (1960); Thomas M.
Franck International Law: Through National or International Courts?, 8 VILL. L. REV. 139 (1962-63);
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (Oxford Univ. Press 1990); THOMAS
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emphasis was different.  Rules seemed more necessary to restrain the Cold
War great powers.  The United Nations loomed large, the Charter providing
at once a set of restraints, a venue for multilateralism, and a ready vernacular
and perspective for the legitimation and delegitimation of national power. 
For the Manhattan School, global governance was to be as much a work of the
spirit, a work on the self, as a structure of rules and institutions.  Most
famously, perhaps, for Louis Henkin, the human rights regime matured into
a global “ideology,” common to elites everywhere, limiting and channeling the
exercise of public power automatically, without the machinery of enforce-
ment.   If he was right, Holmes and Hohfeld had been defeated.  It was not all
about remedies and every right no longer implied a correlative duty.   Social
order had been replaced—and ensured—by collective social practice and
belief.   
Human rights were not the only ideas proposed for governance-by-
consciousness.  There was also democracy, human freedom, and the human
propensity to truck and barter.  Neo-liberalism, after all, was not only the
disciplining creed of a few international financial institutions and first world
governments; it was the spirit of an age, enforcing itself wherever two were
gathered in its name, in city governments, corporate boardrooms, local central
banks and dozens of national civil services.   In this, the Manhattan School
echoed Wilhelm Roepke’s famous description of the liberal order of the
nineteenth century, held together not by institutions of global governance but
by a common appreciation of the “liberal principle” that governments should
simply not allow the political to contaminate the economic.    For Roepke, this
“liberal spirit,” plus the Gold Standard, constituted what he termed an “As-If-2008] THE MYSTERY OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 839
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World-Government” more valuable and ethically compelling than the
collectivist fantasies of both European and international lawyers after the
Second World War.
3   For the Manhattan school, it was the activist spirit of
Dag Hammerskjold, working flexibly with great, if often contradictory,
principles, along the boundaries of law and politics, East and West, guided by
the imaginary perspective of an international community, an international
judiciary, and an international jury of his peers.   
The third great project of re-imagination was a bit of a reaction to the
reaction.   We might place it at Yale, in the person of Harold Koh, though I
suspect he would trace his lineage to Philip Jessup, and it is probably more
accurate to locate the origins at Harvard, home to the legal process tradition,
to Det Vagts, Henry Steiner, Abe and Toni Chayes and Anne Marie
Slaughter.
4   For these thinkers, the key to global governance lay in national
law, national courts and the procedures for allocating authority among them.
The state was opened up, broken apart, replaced by the shifting internal
dynamics of national bureaucracies and local powers, and the distribution
among them of the authority to resolve various issues.   The focus shifted from
keeping the peace, structuring co-existence or facilitating projects of
cooperation to dispute resolution and the chastening of political will which
comes with exposure to the sands of international reaction.   Their work was
also interdisciplinary, drawing on public choice theories and new institu-
tionalisms in both political science and economics. 
No doubt these traditions overlapped and learned from one another.  Each
explicitly rejected conventional disciplinary boundary, blurred public and
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elsewhere in the social sciences.  For each, the legal order stood at the center
of global order.  For each, the global order had a structure—a world of
cooperation and co-existence, of democracies and others, of states promoting
a world public order of freedom or justice and those with more dubious
designs.  Each had something to say about the middle spaces of transnational
cultural influences, families of law, public/private partnerships, soft power
and social influence.  Each rejected the pictures of law drawn by earlier
schools of legal thought as they remembered them, whether “naturalism” or
“positivism,” “formalism” or “realism.”  And they rejected the images of law
drawn by laymen and colleagues in other disciplines looking at the legal
regime from the outside.  From that perspective, the fluidity and pluralism of
the legal system, the immanence of value in legal order, as well as law’s
engagement with social and political processes were all not visible.  From the
inside, it was all invention, imagination, new governance and the art of
managing conflicting principles while aiming for the receding horizon of
global justice.
There is now a large literature assessing the weaknesses and limitations
of these schools of thought.  They have criticized one another and survived
long enough to give rise to internal eddies of discontent and rethinking.  I
won’t revisit here what went wrong.  Like the disciplines which preceded
them, they remain all around us, their central ideas, institutional and doctrinal
innovations remain useful, and are, in fact, used every day by courts,
diplomats, activists and scholars.  
Already when I began teaching international law, more than twenty years
ago, it seemed sensible to look outside this lexicon for “new approaches to
international law.”  For years we found ourselves fully occupied simply
understanding the history and limits of these many earlier efforts to think in
new ways about how the world is legally constituted.  Just when we were
beginning to think we might have had it licked, I am afraid that these
traditions, like those which they overthrew, lost their ability to inspire.  They
remain active, paradigms for today’s routine academic practices.  But they
suddenly seem parochial, studied elsewhere as yet more idiosyncratic
emanations of the American empire.  Each has been sullied by the struggle for
policy bite in Washington.   Moreover, I am sure their proponents would agree
that even at their best, these more recent traditions remain rudimentary and
partial answers to the question “how are we governed at the global level.”
Much remains to be learned.  
The last few years have brought yet another group of large scale
proposals to re-interpret the world of law.  All stand on the legacy of our
traditional disciplines, renewed by Yale, Manhattan and Harvard.  Let me
mention just a few, to give a sense for the scale and diversity of the efforts
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Although I doubt they will ultimately be most influential, it is useful to
begin with the many scholars who have experimented over the last few years
with the metaphor of a “constitution” to describe the legal order beyond the
nation state.
5  Many in European legal circles were entranced by the idea that
their new bureaucratic machinery might be re-christened a constitutional
order.  In public international law, we have been encouraged to think of the
U.N. Charter as a “constitution,” particularly when it comes to the use of
force.  Others have seen a “constitutional moment” in the emergence of human
rights as a global vernacular for the legitimacy of power.  Some trade scholars
have proposed that we see the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) as a
constitutional order.  The WTO has rendered the GATT more properly legal,
strengthening dispute settlement and deepening engagement with national
legal regulations.  If, as Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann urges, we were to add human
rights to what John Jackson famously termed the WTO’s substantive legal
“interface” between national regulatory systems, we might well see the result
as a constitution, at least to the extent we are willing to see the legal regime
of the European Union in constitutional terms.  At the same time, others find
the key to world public law in the relations among national constitutions.
Comparative constitutional law is front and center in their accounts of how we
are governed at the global level. 
These efforts are interesting because they illustrate most starkly both the
wish that things were, in fact, legally constituted  in some way and the
realization that we do not now have a workable description of the world’s
legal order.  The constitution must be written, discovered—our various partial
institutions reinterpreted in constitutional terms.  
I expect those most enthusiastic about constitutional metaphors
understand all too well that theirs is not only a proposal to discover the
world’s constitution, but a project to interpret the world as constituted, held
together in constitutional terms.  Wouldn’t things be better if the world’s legal
order were constituted, whether by the WTO or the UN Charter or in some
other way?  And we know that in such matters saying it can sometimes make
it so.  This is why the effort to imagine a world constitution can sometimes
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worked well at home and that your own constitution may even be threatened
by global pressures of one sort or another, it can feel like a project of the
utmost seriousness and urgency to interpret the world in constitutional terms.
But constitutionalist re-description is but one of many ongoing efforts to
rethink the legal order by which we are governed globally.  
We might start with the enormous project of legal sociology underway
at Australian National University to map the world of “regulation.”   Peter
Drahos and John Braithwaite begin with the observation that an enormous
number of rules are neither made nor enforced by states and those which are
will often have been written and may well be enforced by people in other
states and other institutions.
6  They focus on private ordering, standard setting
bodies, the social practices and patterns of influence within industry and
professional bodies.  Their project is descriptive—who functions in this
hidden world where rules are made, how do they become powerful, what kinds
of rules and principles travel from one domain to another and which are left
behind?  Their ambition is to share knowledge and access to the inner
workings of global regulation more equitably and to empower those left out
of the process. 
Then there is the new project on “global administrative law” at New
York University.
7   Richard Steward, Ben Kingsbury and their colleagues seek
to rethink public power as a form of administration, regardless of whether it
is exercised by courts or private actors, integrated into a conventional
hierarchy of public authority or dispersed across the globe.  Looked at this
way, they ask whether conventional administrative law reforms—trans-
parency, participation, opportunity to be heard, judicial review—might not
offer a recipe for improving global governance.    
At the same time, in Frankfurt, we have the work of Gunther Teubner and
others influenced by Niklas Luhmann’s “systems theory.”
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Deconstruction of Law’s Hierarchy 31 L. & SOC. REV. 763 (1997); Gunther Teubner, Contracting Worlds:
The Many Autonomies of Private Law, 9 SOC. & LEG. STUD. 399 (2000).  See also the collected essays in
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (Guther Teubner, ed., 1997).  This literature draws strongly on Niklas
Luhmann’s “system theory” approach.  See broadly NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS (John Bednarz
& Dirk Baeker trans., Stanford Univ. Press, 1995); NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM (Fatima
Kastner et al. eds., Klaus A. Ziegert trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
9. See, for example Charles F. Sabel, A Quiet Revolution of Democratic Governance: Towards
Democratic Experimentalism, in GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 121 (OECD 2001); Michael Dorf
& Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998);
Charles F. Sabel and William Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004); James Liebman and Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely
Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform (2003) 28 N.Y.U. REV. OF L.
AND SOC. CHANGE 183; Gráinne de Búrca, The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the
European Union, 28 E.L.R. 814 (2003); LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Gráinne
de Búrca and Joanne Scott eds., Hart Publishing 2006); Susan Strum, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001); David M. Trubek and Louise G.
Trubek, Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Co-
ordination, 11 EUR. L. J. 343 (2005).  See also Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and
the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004), which provides
a good overview of a large portion of the new governance literature. For some of my thoughts concerning
the new governance approach, see David Kennedy, Remarks for the “New Governance Workshop” Harvard
Law School, February 25-26, 2005, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/dkennedy/speeches/
Remarks.pdf.
argue, the world is ordered in a series of semi-autonomous systems, loosely
associated with industries or domain of social practice or belief, each with its
own rules and procedures, even constitutional procedures and principles,
pursuing its own logic: a health system, a sports system, a trade system, a
pharmaceutical system, and so on.  Governments, or certainly diplomacy,
would be but one system among many.  The research objective is to identify
these systems, study their emergence and interaction, in search of a general
model—what constitutes a system, how do they change and interact with one
another, how are conflicts resolved, how are systems defended?    
We also have an emergent body of literature proposing “new gover-
nance” ideas developed domestically and in Brussels for the international
order.  Embracing tenets of “democratic experimentalism” and innovative
institutional arrangements disconnected from more traditional modes of
thinking about law and regulation, scholars of this school seek to wed notions
of democratic legitimacy with economic efficiency in an ambitious project of
renewal and change.
9
One of the most interesting and sustained grand projects of reimagination
has been the effort by a new generation to rethink the relationship between the
international law and the Third World.  Sparked by the work of scholars like
Tony Anghie, Makau Mutua, James Gathii, B.S. Chimni and Balakrishnan
Rajagopal, this intellectual movement is not associated with a university—
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SOAS and the affiliated schools of the University of London do you find a
critical mass.
10  They are exploring the continuing significance of the colonial
project for the structure of global law and political life, identifying issues not
solved by transforming the dominions into formal sovereigns that they might
participate in the institutions of intergovernmental life and take responsibility
for territorial government.  As one might expect from the work of a broad
network, the results are far more diverse in viewpoint and method than what
has so far emerged from the parallel efforts at NYU or ANU or Frankfurt.
What they share is the ambition to redraw the map of global governance from
the periphery, placing altogether different issues and modes of rulership in
foreground focus and dissatisfaction with their own intellectual forefathers in
the era of decolonization every bit as intense as that felt by the reinventions
of the North about our conventional disciplines.  
These are all powerful reconceptualizations.  It is always tempting in this
sort of situation to imagine that each has hold of one piece of the elephant.
They do, certainly.  But they are also each proposing a different elephant.
Each offers a vision, more or less in the mode of our conventional disciplines
before them, which they claim to be a more complete account, a plausible total2008] THE MYSTERY OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 845
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or ground level answer to the question of how we are governed, as a candidate
to function as queen of the sciences when it comes to global governance.  We
ought not to dismiss these claims as misguided hubris.  Constitutionalism, of
course, has claimed pride of place for years in our own legal academy, as the
study of process, civil procedure and federal courts did a generation before,
or private law before that.  The structure of governance has always been both
the sum of the disciplinary insights spawned in its name and a struggle among
perspectives claiming to be foundational.  
If we are to embrace constitutionalism, we will need to explain not only
what it adds to the knowledge we have gleaned from, say, public international
law or international economic law, but what it means to treat constitutionalism
as, well, constitutional.  Each field, after all, carries with it a disciplinary
sensibility about what the problems are and where solutions lie.  Standing on
each foundation, some problems will be easy to see, others harder.  Some
actors and authorities and perspectives will be foregrounded, others not.  As
we compare frameworks for thinking about global governance, we will need
to assess their relative blindness and insight and the consequences of treating
one rather than another as the base.  What projects of reform, what space for
politics, will be enabled setting off from one rather than another of these
various points of view? 
Moreover, these are certainly not the only new ideas out there about how
it all fits together.  The traditions of public choice and institutional economics,
imported into law by law and economics scholars, also propose new ways of
explaining global legal order.
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in the English language academy.  But we must imagine there is rethinking
underway as well in Moscow and Tehran and Beijing and—it will be a long
list.  And we are still looking only at the projects in law—there are every bit
as energetic projects moving ahead across the social sciences.   
Having multiplied things so far, I should probably come clean as having
my own pet project of totalizing re-description.  My own focus has been on
the work of experts and the significance of expert knowledge in governing our
world.  Over the last several years, I have studied the work of various experts
—international lawyers, human rights activists, military professionals, experts
in economic development—to understand the nature of their expertise, the
knowledge they bring to bear, their background consciousness about what is
and is not part of their domain, the terms through which they argue for one or
another position, and the channels through which they make what they know
real.  On the basis of these preliminary studies, I have proposed pieces of what
I hope will become a general model of expertise and the work of experts in
global governance.
12  
For now, let me simply say that I have become convinced the role of
experts is drastically understudied.  We focus on statesmen and public opinion
and not enough on the ways in which their choices, their beliefs, are shaped
by background players.  After all, if for a generation everyone thinks an
economy is a national input/output system to be managed, and then suddenly
they all become convinced that an economy is a global market for the
allocation of resources to their most productive use through the efficiency of
exchange in the shadow of a price system, lots has changed.  That is also
governance.  At the same time, our ideas about experts and expertise are rarely
realistic.  We often overestimate their capacity and influence.  We imagine
that development economists know how to bring about development or that
lawyers know how to build an institution or draft a statute to bring about a
desired result.  What holds them back is the friction and resistance of context
—or incompetence.  At the same time, we rarely have a good picture of the
blind spots and biases introduced by expertise, along the lines of the old adage
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rarely know what they don’t know and know a great deal that is fashion, that
is borrowed, misunderstood, reduced to a slogan, or simply too contradictory
to be “applied” or “implemented” straightforwardly.
It may be unwise to call what I am after “experts” and “expertise,” for we
are used to equating these terms with the work of the professions—scientists,
technical people, doctors and lawyers.  My hypothesis is broader: that the
relationships between power and knowledge which we can see in the profes-
sions most familiar to us—international lawyers, development professionals
—may well model the relationship between what both laymen and leaders
know and do.  Politicians are also experts, of a sort, as are citizens.  It is not
just that they have learned to think about international affairs from expert
talking heads.  It is that they also play roles and learn about their commitments
and possibilities in social networks akin to disciplines or fields. 
For all these people—technical experts, politicians, citizens—it is not at
all obvious how ideas become policies or how the expertises of various fields
or disciplines blend together in that process.  But I am convinced that were we
to understand the mutually constitutive relationship between professional
practice and knowledge we would have displaced the agent/structure debate
which has paralyzed so much of the social sciences when thinking about
international affairs.  Rather than agents in structures, we might come to see
people with projects, projects of affiliation and disaffiliation, commitment and
aversion, and with wills to power and to submission.  We would find these
people organized in disciplines, speaking with one another in the vernacular
perhaps of public international law or international economic law or
constitutionalism.  Their disciplines would have a history, an intellectual
history, and an institutional and political history.  Their knowledge would be
less recipe than rhetoric.  Their practice would often be best understood as
assertion and argument, the vernacular of those arguments structured like any
other language.   Were we to pursue this approach, we would focus less on
procedures or institutions, or even substantive norms and values.  The
constitution, if we could call it that, for global governance would be written
in the disciplinary habits, including the habits of mind and patterns of
argument, of people with projects operating with expertise.  
IV.  COMPARATIVE EVALUATION: THINGS WE SHOULD BE SURE TO SEE
Against this background, I come to the mystery of global governance in
a skeptical and comparative frame of mind.  The range of proposals for
understanding the structure of our legal world makes me skeptical that we will
find any of these tales persuasive.  Useful, perhaps, but can it really be that we
are so soon constituted?  Do we know enough about the structure of global
arrangements, whether legal or political, economic, cultural, to be confident
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globe?  What if the distances are so great, the forces so chaotic, the
differences in situation so profound that the constitution ratifies what ought
rather to be transformed?   
At the same time, these are the proposals on the table: constitutionalism,
global administrative law, autopoetic regulatory systems, and so on.  How
ought we to compare them?  Each has given rise to a specialized profession.
Each offers a focal point for reform.  In comparing their vices and virtues, we
will each have our own list of issues and facts about the world we think it
particularly critical to take into account and we will each judge these various
efforts in part by their ability to do justice to our own preoccupations.  Let me
share a few of my own,—the check list against which I would judge the
constitutionalist, or any other, project to rethink global governance.  A brief
list of things to which I worry we have paid insufficient attention.   
First would be the sheer density of rules and institutions in the global
space.  We often imagine that the world is an anarchic struggle or a
deregulated market over which we have managed to throw but a thin net of
rules.  But the situation is more the opposite—law and regulation and rule at
every turn.  Economic globalization means legal globalization; every crate
travels with a packet of rights and privileges, every transfer relies on a
network of institutions and rules.  The internationalization of politics means
the legalization of politics.  Every agent of the state, of the city, of the region,
acts and interacts on the basis of delegated powers, through the instruments
of decision and rule and judgment.  Indeed, globalization has fragmented both
economic and political power, but it has not de-legalized it.  On the contrary,
even war today—asymmetric war, high-tech war, war stretched across a global
battlespace, war of missiles and missives—is an affair of rules and regulations
and legal principles.  As a result, the problem is not to bring political or legal
actors into law, but to understand and, where necessary, rearrange the laws
which constitute those actors, channel their interactions and influence their
relative powers.   
Second, and related, is the disorderliness, the pluralism, the uncertainty,
the chaos, of all those rules and principles and institutions.  The globalization
of law, the legalization of politics and economics, has brought with it a
tremendous dispersion of law.  All manner of rules, enforced and un-enforced,
may, as a matter of fact, affect any global transaction.  And as a matter of law
—conflicting and multiplying jurisdictions, asserting the validity or
persuasiveness of their rules, with no decider of last resort.   Some of this
disorder is structured in one or another way—various federalisms, multiple
jurisdictions, choices of law provisions, even races to the top and bottom.  But
some is also a matter of struggle and conflict, between legal orders, ideas,
powers and traditions.  Our picture will need to have room for all this disorder
—there is no use denying or overlooking it, pretending coherence.  And it is
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plurality of law—it might or it might not.  Some would gain and others would
lose.  We will need to assess the dynamic and distribution effects of one or
another attitude toward the disorderliness of global governance.
Third are a series of issues we might think of as the inverse side of law.
I worry that our ideas about global governance pay too little attention to the
informal and the clandestine—to customary norms, background patterns of
private and public expectation, black markets and illegal flows.  We rarely
distinguish carefully the many degrees of separation from the legal foreground
—the clandestine, the informal, the illegal, the corrupt, the black market—
may all be quite different.  Moreover, as everyone exercising a prosecutor’s
discretion to bring charges well knows, those who govern often strategize
about residual of non-compliance to be tolerated.  Under a regime of exchange
controls, a black market may be more effective than a tariff, and so on.  We
will need to pay more attention to these back-side calculations and effects, and
articulate more clearly how awareness of their significance alters our sense for
the big questions: where and what is global power, how is politics organized,
where are the levers for change?   
In a similar vein, we are prone to imagine that things which happen in the
exceptions to rules as outside the law altogether.  As if the exception was not
also a rule.  Guantanamo, for example, far from being a legal black hole, is
one of the most regulated places on the planet; it is simply that different rules
apply and different rules do not apply.  Indeed, our pictures of global
governance are woefully inadequate in their attention to the significance of
legal privileges.  We forget that law is not merely a matter of rights and
duties, but also of privileges to injure without compensation.  When UNHCR
knocks on the door of a sovereign and asks that a refugee be admitted, the
response will be rooted not only in sovereign power but also in legal privilege
—the privilege to exclude, to define those one will admit, to defend and fence
the national territory.  Despoiling the rainforest is not only an economic
decision; it is also the exercise of legal privilege.  In our thinking about global
governance, I worry that we focus too much on the fate of a few hundred
detainees held here and there, while our legal order meanwhile wraps the
violent wartime deaths of thousands in the “privilege” to kill on the battlefield
and the comforting reassurance that all the “collateral damage” was
proportional, necessary, and reasonable.  It is customary to understand things
we don’t like—war or poverty or sovereign discretion—as facts or powers
prior to law.  But each is also a legal institution.  A refugee is not simply a
person who flees his homeland; a refugee is also a legal status and legal
regime which governs those who flee, often radically transforming who may
leave, where they may go, and even whom they will imagine themselves to be.
I suppose it is not surprising that when we pick up a book about
international law to find out how the environment is regulated, we turn to the
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the most prominent international rules and principles and institutions
dedicated to environmental protection.  But we know the law also offers
comfort to the despoiler, to the sovereign and company and property owner
who wants to cut down that forest, just as we know that the legal regime for
migration is far broader than rules about citizenship and asylum.  Migration
is also a function of employment law and social security and family law and
taxation and banking and criminal law and . . . it is hard to see the edge.  It we
sought a comprehensive guide to the laws affecting the incidence of interstate
violence we would probably not even begin with the laws of war.  Much
would depend on our theory of violence; if it is all about economic struggle,
we would look to the laws constituting economic power and distributing
access to resources.  If war was but another method of dispute resolution and
diplomatic communication, we would look at the law structuring the
diplomatic process, claims, state responsibility, countermeasures and the rest.
And so on.  
Fourth, as I have said, it is easy to think about global governance,
particularly when thinking about it constitutionally, as a static plan, a machine
to be turned on.  But our various proposals and reinterpretations will fall into
an ongoing and unruly process.  They will strengthen forces and weaken
others in ways which will change how they function.  Global governance is
already underway and proposals for its improvement will need to think
strategically about the forces which must be strengthened to ensure their
success.  Are we betting on the middle powers, on the great democracies, on
those with capacity to project force abroad, on the rising giants of India and
China, South Africa or Brazil?   
There is nothing unusual in the idea that a scheme for global governance
ought to be conscious not only about who will win and lose, but about whom
one expects to carry the program to victory.  For the United Nations, it was to
be the United States, founder, host and leading source of funds, along with the
other Allied Powers granted veto status in the Security Council.  Powers
changed, new players emerged, and the Charter was amended, in practice if
not in text.  It is also easy to see that the success of the GATT depended upon
harnessing the great trade blocs and dominant traders within its terms from the
start, just as the Coal and Steel Community, whatever its legal structure,
depended upon cementing a core trade-off between France and Germany
which could be expanded, both geographically and substantively.  The
interests to be engaged were not simply states; they were farmers and
industrialists.  Indeed, trade scholars have long understood that bargaining in
the GATT or WTO—running a successful “trade war” if you like—is all
about placing pressure on domestic social and economic sectors one suspects
may be able to move public decision-makers abroad: perhaps farmers or
cheese-makers or the automotive industry.  The WTO offers a framework for
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Of course, not all contemporary discussions of global governance are
silent on their implicit political and economic strategy.  But I must say I worry
about the plausibility of the coalitions many of today’s most popular
governance projects would place on the field to ensure their coming into being
—non-governmental actors, national judges, international media elites,
foundations, corporations enacting new found ideas about social responsi-
bility, wrapped together and styled the “international community” or
“international civil society.”  There is certainly power there.  But it can also
be a rather weak reed, can stimulate a backlash more powerful than what it can
bring to the table in defense, and can lash a global governance system to a
narrow vision of the interests and issues to be managed.  It is easy to overlook
conflict and risk and alternative visions of society and justice when your
constituents have styled you as the voice of the universal.
In a similar vein, I worry that our efforts to comprehend global
governance have focused far too much on the authority of agents we can see
to act within structures we understand.   We have paid too little attention to
the myriad ways power flows through the capillaries of social life, perhaps
particularly at the global level.  Many of these are flows of finances, of
resources, of arms.  But many are flows of belief, modes of knowledge, of
affiliation and disaffiliation, the social movement of wills to power, the desire
to submit, the experience of triumph and victimization, pride and shame.  All
these things move like a virus or a fad, but our epidemiology is weak, our
sociology of status, convention and emulation at the global level rudimentary.
In a sense, governance by knowledge is easy to picture.  We know that
the idea of a “national economy” or a “nation-state” can rise and fall, changing
a great deal about how people govern and how they imagine themselves in
community.  Similarly, by tracing the rise and fall of endogeneity in
economics, we might learn a great deal about what seems possible for policy
in different places and times.  But imagine a map of global governance which
tracked the distribution of pride and shame across the world’s economies,
political configurations, social and cultural forms.  I am convinced we would
find that social power and submission and all the pleasures and rages which
accompany them both on the global stage will also turn out to be matters of
governance and law.  
Fifth, and finally, I worry that our projects to rethink global governance
fail to grasp the depth of the injustice of the world today and the urgency of
change.  They are projects of moderate reform for which the normal is stable
and sustainable.  Even our best disciplinary maps make inequality and
domination in the world system difficult to see.   We imagine that poverty was
and remains simply there, precursor to growth, fact and context for policy.
We understand far too little about the dynamic relationship between growth
and poverty.  In a similar way, the relationship between rulership and
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and the informal world of clandestine flows.  The alchemy by which
inequality becomes routinized through the vernacular of experts and hardens
as law is tough to unravel, but the effects are everywhere on view.  Just
writing the history of domination and inequality, and their erasure, into the
maps legal intellectuals have already produced will be a great work.  
We will each come to debates about global governance with a sense for
the challenges we face.  The sustainability of our lifestyle and our environ-
ment surely makes the list.  Then there is the demographic challenge, so
pronounced in Europe and the ex-Soviet Union, but also here, or in Saudi
Arabia, which will force a reckoning with immigration or security or both.
There is the challenge posed by economic success in the third world, by the
hundreds of millions of Chinese and Indian individuals who have emerged
from poverty into our industrial present.  Speaking loosely, and to put it in the
starkest terms, with economic globalization and the continued loss of public
capacity, large swaths of the world will, in twenty years, have whatever social
security system, whatever environmental regime, whatever labor law,
whatever wage rate prevails in China.   
And there is the parallel challenge posed by economic failure in the third
world, by the revolution of rising frustrations among the hundred of millions
of individuals who can see in, but for whom there seems no route through the
screen except through rebellion and spectacle.  If you put just these threats
together, we confront an accelerating social and economic dualism—a
rumbling fault line between two global architectures, between an insider and
an outsider class, between leading and lagging sectors, both within and
between national economies and political units.  
It is disheartening that while the world fractures, so many of our debates
about global governance are content merely to embroider the habits of the
technical class, decorating their management with intellectual filigree.  So
much scholarship today is simply a brief for the significance and vitality of a
narrow professional culture and sensibility.  Its authors struggle for political
rapprochement between a center-right attuned to market failures and a center-
left that has lost faith in its own nostalgia for what it remembers as the potent
regulatory and administrative state of earlier days.  These political tendencies
are status quo parties, timid about social conflict, hesitant about distribution,
resigned to poverty, harnessed to a culture of warfare. 
I would prefer we set out with questions of political economy in the
foreground and that we came to global governance and the constitutionaliza-
tion of the planet not as an opportunity to depoliticize world affairs, but as the
chance to pursue a new politics attuned to these challenges.  How does the
world remain so unequal, how is hierarchy and domination reproduced?  What
does law have to do with the organization of politics and economics?  If you
are an intellectual in the periphery of the world system—the intellectual,
geographic, political, cultural or economic periphery—what can you do to2008] THE MYSTERY OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 853
change things?  Our work on global governance should aim to answer
questions like these. 
We know, for example, that bargaining power is also distributed by law
both between nations and across production chains.   If the trading system is
to be our world constitution, how does it distribute bargaining power in global
markets?   When small or medium sized enterprises in Vietnam compete with
producers in Laos or Mexico and then bargain with globally networked
purchasers—how does law allocate their powers?  Who captures the rent?
Not only developing governments and their employees seek rents; so do Wal-
Mart and Toyota and Chevron.  Moreover, how are regulatory powers
allocated where economic factors other than labor move more freely than
sovereign power?  Why do property rights travel so securely when the extra-
territorial reach of labor law or employment discrimination or environmental
protection law continues to seem unreasonable?  How do we decide whether
a low wage development strategy is an unfair subsidy or the extraterritorial
application of labor law a non-tariff barrier to trade?  Indeed, it may well turn
out that antitrust or contract is the new global constitutional law.  Should we
so conclude, we will want to understand the industrial policy embedded within
it.  
In short, I worry that everywhere global public capacity is not only too
anemic or irregular to confront the stakes of global poverty, conflict, injustice.
It is also the instrument of that poverty, those conflicts, and that injustice.   As
a result, where our shared dreams about global governance remain rooted in
the status quo, they risk lulling us into complacency.   We need to remember,
as we speak about these things, that all of us in the professional classes of the
North confront the rest of humanity with our entitlements and lifestyle and
also with our talk about the “international community” and “global gover-
nance.”   It is not enough any more to say we favor better law or good gover-
nance.  We will need to ask for whom we govern, for what form of political,
social and economic life do we propose a constitution.  
V.  CONSTITUTIONALISM AS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Among the lawyers rethinking the way the world is ruled, the
constitutionalists have an advantage.  They put their wish for a coherent legal
map of powers front and center.   As a result, the limits are also on view: most
crucially, the tendency of the constitutionalist vernacular to dress up
normative projects in sociological terms.  There is no question we need better
maps of the legal regime through which we are governed globally.   If we
could understand how the whole scheme was constituted, we would be ahead
of the game.  But the current crop of constitutionalist images of global
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political order by sacralizing the institutional forms with which they are most
familiar.   In this, they remind us to be wary.
It may be my background in American law, but I have always felt
constitutionalism a rather weak sociology of the way power functions.  The
U.S. Constitution is fascinating as a meditation on the possible relationships
among a series of legal authorities.  As a text, it could be the stuff of
normative imagination or political philosophy.  I am sure it is sometimes a
useful textual reference for interpretive practice in quite specific institutional
settings.  But it is a lousy description of power in American society, and a
quite inaccurate map of how Washington works.  Private power and economic
form is altogether missing from the story, along with the role of political
parties and money, the dynamics of social dualism in American life, changing
ethical and political fashion, the world of background norms, informal and
customary arrangements and much more.   The document reads as if powers
outside the territory and entities outside the text are irrelevant to public order.
If we imagine the world it constitutes as our political world, we will miss a
great deal
Perhaps our fledgling international constitutionalisms have it more to
right, but I am worried by the extent to which people come to these debates
carrying baggage from their national constitutional traditions.   Most scholars
of global governance think their own societies do work rather well and many
credit their constitution in some way.   Even if this is all true, we would still
be right to question whether these constitutionalist ideas are useful at the
global level, mostly for the familiar reason that international society is
altogether different: larger, more fragmented, lacking, as they say, in demos.
Take judicial review; it seems central, though many democratic constitutional
traditions do not have it.   As American lawyers, we are familiar with dozens
of arguments about the uses and abuses of judicial review, all of which are
expressed in very general terms—treating things like “executive power” and
“independent judgment” as if they were universals we might place in an ideal
relationship with one another rather than idealized descriptions of quite
specific institutions in the particular context of American history and political
life.  Indeed, I have often thought it would be a useful heuristic in discussions
of global governance here in the United States simply to ban the use of catch
phrases and code words from American constitutional debates precisely so
that we could better remember when we are speaking about general things and
when about our own experience.
Moreover, I wonder whether our national constitution has done such a
good job constituting us as a nation, or whether the American cult of the
constitution has not also made us less able to see enduring divisions within our
society or imagine links with people outside the territorial boundaries of the
place we call the “United States.”   As a tool for social justice, we would have
to concede the record is rather mixed.   There have been some astonishing2008] THE MYSTERY OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 855
successes and important, if more routine pressure against governmental over-
reaching.  But a great deal of injustice which has been routinized or
legitimated.  The inequality in education for citizens in side by side suburbs,
one wealthy, the other poor, remains a scandal and it is rooted in legal
arrangements and ideas about cities and property and taxation.  Or take the
Senate—by entrenching the power of the least populated states, the
constitution has continuously structured the nation’s political economy.
Constitutions are about focusing political attention, removing some things
from routine political struggle, placing others front and center, arranging the
powers to be taken lightly and those to be accorded great respect. 
On balance, we might be quite satisfied with how that has gone here at
home.  Our European colleagues might well feel the same way, if for different
reasons and with a different history.   But imagine a person who came to the
constitutional discussion at the global level from a country with a different
history of constitutionalism at home—a country whose constitution removed
different issues from contestation, or where the constitution was irrelevant to
the political struggles of the nation, or enshrined ethnic or religious divisions
or political ideological commitments with which he or she disagreed, or whose
formal terms had been altogether swamped by other modes of power sharing,
rent-seeking or corruption.  It is not just that such a person might not under-
stand or value the global constitution we proposed, for we would certainly
offer the world our own more workable arrangements.   It might be that, as the
global struggle among us unfolds, we will find ourselves with a global
constitution of a completely different kind than we might anticipate around
this table.  
As a tool for thinking about global governance, the constitutionalist
literature has some unfortunate biases.   Perhaps most serious is the idea that
the world is, in fact, “constituted,” that things do add up, one way or the other.
 We might think of this as a bias against the perception of disorder or
contradiction.   There is often what we might call a “purposive bias,” that
elements in a constitutional order have a function, they are things you can do
something with, they reflect social needs or have their justification one or
another way in instrumental reason or in a progressive or evolutionary reading
of history.  Such a bias might well predispose us against mystery, against the
aesthetic, the ritualistic, the accidental or path dependent, the neurotic or
simply the unknown in our governmental forms.    In a similar way, it has been
difficult to think of power and knowledge as mutually constitutive or as social
and cognitive flows in a constitutionalist framework which names the players
and the channels of their interaction.  
Most global constitutionalist projects are centered on existing institu-
tional arrangements: the United Nations, or the World Trade Organization or
the interactions of national constitutional courts and regimes.   There is always
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center?  Would things be better if we all treated them as central rather than
simply as one more or less significant organization?   Each of these institu-
tions carries with it a project and a history—to free trade, to settle disputes,
to enforce the peace.  They are often worthy projects, but it would be odd to
organize governance for the whole around the procedures once thought
workable for these more limited aims.  Constitutionalizing our existing gover-
nance structures does aim to remove them from contestation and revision,
harden their division of power and freeze their political and legal players.   If
all this could be accomplished by interpretation—if we, here, could contribute
in some small way to the process by which the world’s elites came to think of
these institutions in constitutional terms, I do worry about the responsibility
we would bear for foreclosing other projects and players and possibilities.  
Global constitutionalist discussions also often have a proceduralist bias.
It can be very difficult to uncover the substantive biases and political projects
of proposals for global governance.  They all present themselves in even-
handed terms, as if they were, in fact, drafted behind a veil of ignorance. 
Sometimes it is easy to see the trick, treating all “states” equally is hardly to
be even-handed given the astonishing inequality of states.  But more often it
takes great work to understand who has been structured to win and who to lose
in global legal and institutional arrangements.   
At the same time, the entire project of global legal arranging offers itself
as innocent of value and ideology and cultural predisposition.  All that has been
pushed down, below the line of sovereignty, a matter for each local or national
community to decide for itself.  The international legal order expresses questions
of value as “rights” or “principles” which are at least aspirationally universal,
treating everything else as an “interest” or an “ideology” of the part, the nation,
the region, the culture.  To speak substantively places you off the international
plane, expressing something we understand to be the interest or attributes of
states and organizations and individuals and groups, rather than qualities of the
international legal order itself.  
We imagine that better procedures will be good for everyone, forgetting
that the international order may have a powerful substantive agenda of its
own.  Focusing on right process, on dispute resolution, on the proper authority
of various actors, we forget how much of the status quo we legitimate and how
we squeeze those who would change it to the margins of legitimate politics.
 There is a charming moment in the Kingsbury and Stewart manifesto for
better global administrative law when they acknowledge what a generation of
law reformers discovered in the development context: improving the
machinery of government makes no sense if scoundrels rule—or if the entire
global architecture has a substantive skew against the poor, against Russia,
against the developing world, against Israel, or whatever.   In such a situation,
you might well not wish to improve the procedures through which global
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Something similar might be argued about Europe.  On one view, the
European Union places in private hands the power to ignite the judiciary
against national democratic decisions in the name of rules and arrangements
largely settled by a transnational technical class.   It is not at all clear that
constitutionalization of this arrangement will democratize; it may well tip
things in quite the other way.  At a minimum, we can see that the European
legal order affects new and old members differently and brings with it a whole
development policy and particular modes of economic and social life.  In a
similar way, the trade regime entrenches a whole range of distinctions
between normal and abnormal traders and trading practices, as well as the hub
and spoke bargaining arrangements which characterize bilateral dealing
between more and less diversified and developed economies.  
Constitutionalism may also bring with it what we might call a “settlement
bias.”  Recasting our situation in constitutional terms can give us the feeling
things are settled.  The struggle is over and this is how it turned out.   Each
year, I ask my international law students how they see the project of their
generation: is this 1648 or 1918 when the entire order needed to be remade,
is it more like 1945 when the system needed to be put back together, reformed,
under new leadership, or is it like 1989, when we finally felt all we needed to
do was implement, enforce and utilize the international system we had spent
so long building in the garage.   As you might expect, most usually choose the
middle washing machine, precisely as marketing studies would predict.  But
the number who take the first has grown sharply in the last years, while the
number who feel that what the world needs now is more of the same has
shrunk to a handful.   
Whether we choose to see these as pre-revolutionary times or not, it
certainly does seem that the situation is far from settled.   Economic, political
and cultural competition of many kinds is underway as we confer here. 
Although the situation may sort itself out peacefully, I expect deep struggles
will probably continue, struggles it will be difficult to routinize into the
normal institutional politics of one or another constitutional arrangement.
Should that happen, I do worry that the constitutionalist frame will encourage
us to take our eye off the ball.  
VI.  CONSTITUTION OR NO, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE WILL BE TRANSFORMED
The current appeal of constitutionalism among those who concern
themselves with global governance is a puzzle.   And it is not just the
Europeans either, although we must admit that projects of constitutional
governance, like enthusiasm for international adjudication, have become
something of a game for intellectuals from the middle powers.    It may simply
have something to do with the lack of workable maps of global power.  We
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a map, some form of cognitive control over global political life.   People may
hang on to their favorite constitutional arrangements, down to the institutional
details, less because they work as designed even at home, let alone can be
expected to do so in the quite different context of global society, than because
they are a familiar map and even an inaccurate map from another country can
be a comfort when crossing into terra incognita.  
Thinking about global governance, I do not think we ought to try to
constitute the world anew.  There is too much work we still need to do simply
to understand how it works, how the forces and factors we have overlooked
might be brought into the analysis.  We will need to collaborate with many
who are not here, place ourselves in a far more global network of research and
inquiry, to map the modes of global power and right.   Going forward, our
most significant contribution to global order may simply be spreading that
knowledge, sharing it more evenly, building an academy outside the elite
institutions of the North and West where these things are seen as we can see
them and encouraging us also to see what can be seen there.
Things like “governance” do change.  In Foucault’s terms, there was the
gallows and then there was the prison timetable.  Or, if you prefer, an “eco-
nomy” can cease to be something to be harnessed for national growth or
development and become an international market, facilitating the flow of
goods and capital.  New ways to govern, new meanings for “politics,” new
identities for subjects and rulers, for law, for the state, and for things like
“culture”—all these things have to be thought up.  And when they are built,
their power must be wrought into knowledge.  
Sometime between 1789 and 1900—and as late as 1960 for much of the
colonial world—governance was consolidated on a global basis around the
national sovereign state.  People were organized into territorial states, granted
citizenship, and government was defined as what national public authorities
did.   Building a national public politics across the planet had a strong emanci-
patory dimension—slaves, women, workers, peasants, colonial dominions
obtained citizenship in relationship to the new institutional machinery of a
national politics.  New global governance, called “government,” centered on
national Parliaments and offered new identities for sovereigns and subjects.
Status dissolved into nation and contract.  The twentieth century also remade
global governance—it was no longer all nations all the time.   Law infiltrated
the political.   Sovereignty, like property, was disaggregated into bundles of
rights: corporatism, administration, public/ private partnerships, management.
Boundaries eroded, merged.  Federalism, power sharing, subsidiarity,
devolution.  Interdependence, social solidarity, policy management.  Here too
there were emancipatory elements and important humanitarian accomplish-
ments.  But here too there were dark sides and disappointments, just as there
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We can be confident that global politics will be remade in the twenty-first
century.  It is just very difficult to say how.  There are lots of forces out there
which might well turn out to have the revolutionary energy to remake the way
we are governed.   The emergence of new leadership across Latin America, of
tribal nationalism in so many places, of religious fundamentalism in the
developed and developing world alike.  We might even see the Iraq war as the
revolutionary project of a confident American leadership supported by an
American middle class experiencing its global vulnerability.   The decline of
the European project, the rise of China, the erosion of confidence in the
West’s recipes for humanism and development.   Any of these might be the
sign of things coming loose.    
As they do come loose, I am afraid “constitutionalism” will not be up to
the task of holding the fort any more than channeling peaceful change.   The
conflicts are too real, the status quo too unstable, our current institutions far
too wedded to the details of technical management to constitute a new politics.
 The same, I’m afraid, may be said about proposals for more transparency,
accountability, participation, good governance or an improved administrative
process.   They may remake management of the regime, but not the politics of
the globe.
My own hope would be that we might quicken the pace and emotional
tenor of decisions in the background institutions of life.  Render the forces
affecting people’s lives more contestable, awaken a sense among actors
outside the spotlight of “leadership” and the fishbowl of the international
political system that they also govern, that they have discretion, that they can
act to change their—and our—institutional arrangements.   I have in mind less
new procedures than a new spirit of management, encouraging the human
experience of responsible freedom throughout the worlds of corporate, private,
public and technical expertise.   
Our objective would be to carry the revolutionary force of the democratic
promise, of individual rights, of economic self-sufficiency, of citizenship, of
community empowerment, and participation in the decisions that affect one’s
life to the sites of global and transnational authority, however local they may
be.   To multiply the sites at which decisions could be seen and contested,
rather than condensing them in a center, in the hope for a heterogeneity of
solutions and approaches and a large degree of experimentation, rather than
an improved constitutional process or more stable settlement.  As we open
spaces for conflict and struggle, moreover, we ought to take a break from the
search for a universal ethics.  Constitutionalism offers an improved institu-
tional platform from which global ethicists can speak for the universal against
those who must be cast out from the community of the universal, just when we
need conversation, interaction and ethical pluralism.  
There are lots of institutional ideas lying around, utopian heuristics for
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institutional diversity, protected by a re-activated sovereignty in the middle
powers of the South.   In such a vision, we might strengthen and defend small
pockets of public sovereignty in cities and churches and corporations and
nations which have the capacity to experiment, as shields for the weak,
guarantors of policy diversity and arenas for democratic political life. 
Perhaps the new politics will be about mobility.  Imagine a grand bargain
linking free trade in goods, free movement of capital, with free movement of
persons, not only in Europe, where it is easy, but globally.  Imagine every
person born not only into national citizenship, but with a once in a life time
five year visa to the country of their choice.   
Or perhaps a new politics will be about building a transnational political
will.  Imagine sovereignty as an open-ended promise of inclusion, not just a
path to membership in the EU for nations along the boundaries who can
swallow the whole acquis, but much more.  Alberta doing a deal with
Montana, New York with Dubai, Palestine finding a place in the European
home.   Imagine every citizen holding three votes to cast in any election in the
world.   If the new politics is to be about empowerment, we might imagine
citizens not only informed, consulted, their polling data serving as base line
for expert management, but actually deciding.   Imagine international policy
juries—citizens empowered to decide for war or peace, for poverty here or
poverty there. 
All these may all be terrible ideas.  At best they are useful heuristics,
reminders of scale and possibility.  What we do know is that global
governance will be remade over the next century.   International law may get
the chance to mop up, but I would rather we seized the opportunity to be
present at the creation. 
Thank you.  I look forward to hearing your thoughts.  